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A partial organization approach to the dynamics of social order in social 
movement organizing 
 
Abstract 
This paper builds on the theoretical notion that social order in organized settings is both 
emergent and decided. It examines the dynamics of emergent and decided social order 
in a timebank, a local community initiative within the alternative currency social 
movement. We propose that organized settings are in practice associated with a 
continuously evolving blend of elements of both decided and emergent social order; 
thus, allowing organizing to evolve over time. Shedding light on the broader puzzle of 
how social order in organized settings evolves, we empirically show how organizational 
dynamics change through the interplay of networks, institutions and decisions, as 
participants adopt and reject various elements of emergent and decided sources of social 
order. In our analysis, we combine content analysis and social network analysis of 
archival data to describe and explain dynamic and inherently relational organizing 
activities that unfold in the community’s day-to-day interactions.  
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Introduction 
At the intersection of social movements and organization studies, the question of social 
order continues to pose a conundrum that sparks sustained debates on organisation in 
and for mobilization for social change. The question whether organization is beneficial 
or detrimental to social movements’ goal accomplishment (e.g., Gamson and 
Schmeidler, 1984; Cloward and Piven, 1984; Walker and Martin, 2019; Zald and Ash, 
1966) should be subservient to the question how organization—and, indeed, 
organizing—takes place. “What matters is how movement participants interpret and 
enact the various opportunities to organize that are available to them” (de Bakker et al., 
2018: 224). 
The question of how the dynamics of social order in social movements 
engenders through its participants is relevant in two ways. First, there is a tension 
between eschewing decided social order—defined as decision-making about 
membership, hierarchy, rules, monitoring, and sanctioning (Ahrne and Brunsson, 
2011)—and nevertheless needing coordination thereby risking a drift toward 
bureaucracy (e.g., Staggenborg, 1988, 2013). Second, there is a threat of a minority of 
participants acumulating disproportionate influence and pushing through their own 
views or interests, that is, oligarchization (Michels, 1911; Leach, 2005; Zald and Ash, 
1966; Diefenbach, 2018). Participants in many social movement initiatives are aware of 
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these tensions and threats, implying that they may be aware of the prevailing social 
order in their initiative, reflect on it, and intervene according to a range of actions they 
deem appropriate.  
However, the question of how participants in social movement initiatives engage 
with social order over time remains largely unanswered. We draw on the recent 
elaboration of partial organization theory (Ahrne and Brunsson, 2011) for social 
movement organizing (de Bakker et al., 2017; den Hond et al., 2015; Simsa and Totter, 
2017) to investigate how STAP—Stadin Aikapankki, a timebank in Helsinki, Finland—
has enacted elements of organizing over time in its efforts to deal with the tensions and 
threats in organizing. We analyse the dynamics of social order by exploring how its 
participants draw on sources of emergent and decided social order. Hence, the main 
question of our study is: How have the dynamics of emergent and decided social order 
evolved over time in the case of STAP? This question speaks to Ahrne et al.’s (2016: 99) 
calls to examine “the consequences of adopting organizational elements in creating 
social order, compared to other modes,” as well as “the interaction between different 
types of social order” and “factors that lead to an increase or decrease in the amount of 
organization.” Our study contributes to answering such questions in a threefold manner: 
firstly, by repositioning the focus on organization in social movement theory from 
organization to the dynamics of organizing; secondly, by introducing the blending of 
elements of decided and emergent order in partial organization theory, and thirdly, by 
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levering these ideas to the debate on the disappearance of organization in organizational 
sociology. 
In what follows, we first discuss partial organization theory, elaborating on the 
idea of functional equivalence between elements of decided and emergent social order. 
We then move to our case study. Organizing (in) STAP has coincided through various 
phases in response to two major issues: the growth and decline in the size of the 
timebank, and taxation of exchanges between members in the timebank in light of the 
Finnish law and the Finnish tax authorities. In light of our findings, we conclude by 
reflecting on organizing social movement initiatives, partial organization theory, and the 
disappearance of organization from organizational sociology.  
Theoretical background 
In examining how participants in collective action organize in ways that manifest their 
ideals, we approach the organizational question in social movement theory (Piven, 
2013) in a way that avoids seeing organization as either beneficial or detrimental to 
movements. Instead, we see movement participants struggle with the question of how to 
organize, juggling with the (often diametrically opposed) implications of relying on 
elements of decided versus emergent social order while pursuing their participatory 
ideals in accomplishing social change. Their aim is not necessarily to eschew structure 
(cf. Freeman, 1972), but to experiment with the “kind of structure […] that will 
maximize participation and prevent anyone from dominating the group” (Leach, 2013: 
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183, original emphasis). Establishing a structure that matches their ideals demands an 
ongoing effort and remains an object of contention (Lee, 2015; Maeckelbergh, 2009). 
We turn to partial organization theory in order to exemplify this quest of matching 
organizing and ideals. 
Ahrne and Brunsson (2011) define organization as a decided social order 
constituted through decision-making regarding membership, hierarchy, rules, 
monitoring, and sanctioning. Ahrne and Brunsson (2011, 2019) lament that much of 
current organization theory is concerned with non-organizational phenomena; in their 
view, scholars have turned away from studying organization to embrace institutions and 
social networks—emergent social orders that do not rely on decision-making. 
Regarding the alleged disappearance of organization from organizational sociology, 
partial organization points to the possibility of a partial absence of decided social order 
in organized settings (den Hond et al., 2019). It further suggests that emergent social 
order should be recognized as having prominence in organized settings.  
In this spirit, we propose elements of emergent social order as functional 
equivalents to the elements of decided social order (cf. Ahrne, 2015). This move 
enables a more detailed and dynamic conceptualization of social order in organized 
settings by relating emergent and decided social order, instead of opposing them. It also 
allows us to explore empirically organizing as the result of enacting and intertwining 
these elements of social order.  
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Emergent and decided social order 
We conceptualize social order as the relatively enduring and stable but not static 
conditions for, and the relatively predictable but not determined patterns of, cooperative 
behaviour (Elster, 1989; see also Fligstein, 2001). Ahrne and Brunsson (2011) 
distinguish decided from emergent social order.  
Emergent social order is relational; it originates in social networks and 
institutions (see e.g. Haug, 2013). Relationships are ties in a social network that develop 
from interpersonal likings, animosities and friendships, as well as from sharing similar 
ideas and interest (e.g., Borgatti et al., 2009; Dunbar and Spoors, 1995). Institutions 
comprise shared norms, values, beliefs, and cultural and behavioural patterns that 
emerge from and stabilize in interaction (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Emergent social 
order thus results from the doing, acting and interacting of people and the ability to 
adjust their behaviour by observing and reflecting on what happens around them. 
Reflexivity and agency allow participants to influence the prevailing social order and 
use elements of emergent social order as functional equivalents to decided social order 
(cf. Ahrne, 2015).  
Decided social order emanates from decision-making on the constitutive 
elements of organization (Ahrne and Brunsson, 2011). Decisions (Brunsson and 
Brunsson, 2017) are interventions in the prevailing social order; they are attempts—
explicit, communicated, archived—at directing the behaviour of organizational 
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members in the case of organizations, and that of others in the case of ‘organization 
outside of organization’. Agency resides in making decisions—not in following, 
obeying and complying with them. Organized settings such as Weber’s (1968) 
bureaucracies, March and Simon’s (1993) organizations, Meyer et al.’s (2006) formal 
organizations and Ahrne and Brunsson’s (2011) complete organizations are depicted as 
decided social orders, because decision-making constitutes them. Nevertheless, all these 
organized settings exhibit emergent social order, too, recognized as the discrepancy 
between formal and informal organizational structure (Gulati and Puranam, 2009) and 
the significance of culture (Meyerson and Martin, 1987; Schein 1985) and social capital 
in organizations (Lin, 2001; Maurer et al., 2011). Emergent social order can be very 
powerful in controlling organizational members’ actions (Barker, 1993). Defining 
organization as decided social order therefore carries the risk of obscuring emergent 
social order: all instances of organization, all organized settings, exhibit both decided 
and emergent social orders.  
One also finds decided social order in organized settings that typically are not 
considered organizations, such as small groups, collectives, communities and social 
movement initiatives. Such settings form when people come together based on 
familiarity, intuitive affection, shared interest, identity or practice (McCarthy and Zald, 
1977; Wilhoit and Kisselburgh, 2015). Their subsequent elaboration  may happen 
without decision-making, when participants distrust and, therefore, reject bureaucracy 
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and hierarchy (de Bakker et al., 2017; Graeber, 2013; Harrison, 1960). Ideological 
choices may thus guide their efforts to keep decided social order at bay. Instead, they 
seek emergent social order to guide collaboration and coordination (Haug, 2013; 
Wilhoit and Kisselburgh, 2015) through trust and norms of mutuality, reciprocity and 
accountability. 
Nevertheless, even anti-authoritarian initiatives may exercise some authority to 
coordinate activities, manage scale and sustain action (Harrison, 1960; Van Meter, 
2017; Zald and Ash, 1966). They may introduce elements of decided social order or 
explicate some elements of emergent social order when behavioural expectations 
stemming from elements of emergent social order are not met. We argue that the 
blending of decided and emergent social order enables initiatives to evolve over time in 
their quest of realizing social ideas.  
Elements of organizing 
Membership, hierarchy, rules, monitoring, and sanctions form Ahrne and Brunsson’s 
(2011) typology of elements of decided social order. We see social order grounded in 
both emergence and decision-making and propose affiliation, non-hierarchical forms of 
authority, norms and values, social control, and intrinsic motivation as functional 
equivalents to Ahrne and Brunsson’s elements. We bring the resulting pairs together 
under shared labels: participation, authority, regulation, control, and motivation.  
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Participation. Participation stands for the closing of social relationships (Weber, 
1968) by including participants and excluding non-participants (Ahrne, 2015; Zald and 
Ash, 1966). The decided order solution to participation is membership whereas the 
emergent order equivalent is affiliation. In the former, a decision is made about who to 
accept as a member (and who not). Membership can also be abrogated by decision. 
While often a list of technical criteria exists to define who would qualify as a member, 
such criteria are often combined with other criteria such as ‘fit’. Becoming a member 
entails a commitment to accept the benefits, rights, constraints and obligations 
associated with membership.  
The emergent social order solution to participation is affiliation: having a link to 
or interaction with a group; being present at particular events; expressing belonging 
(e.g., through behavioural or consumptive choices, cf. Ahrne, 1994; Lichterman, 1996), 
and thereby facilitating recognition of belonging by others (Wilhoit and Kisselburgh, 
2015). Affiliation often follows from social relationships (e.g. friendship) and shared 
social-political convictions (Klandermans, 2004; Rothschild-Whitt, 1979). Participation 
in a movement can be inclusive (Zald and Ash, 1966). For example, people are free to 
join a demonstration or an initiative when they share interest, identity or solidarity 
(Reedy et al., 2016). In other instances, participation is more exclusive. For example, in 
the cases of friendship networks and hobby groups not everybody is welcome, yet 
exclusion does not need to rely on decision-making—exclusion may rely on other 
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mechanisms, such as ignoring, not informing, or espousing other negative attitudes 
toward prospective participants. Leaving may be difficult, too. Even if somebody no 
longer considers him/herself a participant in a collective, incumbents may still consider 
that person affiliated and treat him/her as if s/he still is a participant. 
Authority. Authority refers to the legitimation of domination (Weber, 1968). The 
decided social order solution relies on rational-legal authority established through 
decision. The rights to make and enact decisions is vested in hierarchically structured 
positions and offices (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979). “Hierarchy is an organized form of 
authority” (Ahrne, 2015: 8). Authority is concentrated at the top of the hierarchy, 
although some authority may be delegated to lower levels in the hierarchy for functional 
reasons (e.g. information overload and span of control). Lower-level office holders also 
make decisions that affect the organization and its members, but their authority is 
derived from higher levels and the rights and responsibilities associated with their office 
are circumscribed (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979).  
The emergent social order solution relies on non-hierarchical sources of 
authority, such as quasi charisma (Harrison, 1960) or practical experience or expertise 
(Van Meter, 2017). These sources of authority are transient; the authority they enable 
needs to be established through presence and action: for it to endure, it needs ongoing 
confirmation. Such emergent forms of authority are claimed and accepted in interaction 
(‘this is how it has always been done’) and through action (e.g. by undertaking action 
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without being challenged); they can be attributed to others (‘you know how to do this’). 
Differences among participants’ social position and individual qualities entail the risk 
that a minority of participants become dominant in the group, which may transmute to 
oligarchy, although this trend is not inevitable (Diefenbach, 2018; see also Zald and 
Ash, 1966). 
Regulation. Regulation refers to way by which behavioural expectations and 
prescriptions are expressed. The decided order solution to regulation is to issue rules: 
“Rules are primarily in written form and always pronounced” (Ahrne and Brunsson, 
2011: 86; cf. Rothschild-Whitt, 1979). Rules bind behaviour to specific and explicit 
prescriptions for actions. Members’ deviant behaviours, setbacks or unexpected events 
typically provoke an elaboration of the prevailing set of rules, such that “[t]he 
proliferation of formal rules has been a salient feature of modern organizations” (Zhou, 
1993: 1160).  
The emergent order solution relies on shared norms and values. Norms can be 
conceptualized as the shared and taken for granted understandings that guide 
participants’ behaviour. Norms are grounded in interaction; norms evolve and new 
norms emerge when people attach value to some novel behaviour, which is then 
reinforced through positive feedback (cf. Opp, 2015; Horne, 2001; Elster, 1989). New 
participants become socialized by internalizing the prevailing norms and values of the 
group. Yet, norms are never stable, and socialization is never complete; participants 
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may reflect on the prevailing norms and values as they experience them and then seek to 
change them.  
Control. Control is evaluating how and how well participants adhere to the 
behavioural expectations captured in regulation. Decided order control is practiced 
through systematized monitoring, typically by supervisors or dedicated administrative 
entities (such as HR departments). Monitoring may comprise quantified data; its output 
may be reported and archived. Contemporary data management tools enable more 
extensive monitoring and thereby enhance rule following.  
The emergent social order solution is social control through non-systematic 
evaluative observation among participants. Participants observe the behaviour of their 
fellows, compare it with the prevailing norms and values, and construct what they 
observe as acceptable or not. They may share their observations with other participants 
and jointly reflect upon them. Such assessments may lead to action; exit, voice and 
loyalty is a rough summary of the various options participants can summon (Hirschman, 
1970). Social control may lead to reinforcement of behavioural patterns; for example, 
when others are held accountable for their behaviour, or when a participant reflects over 
their own behaviour in light of prevalent norms and values and changes it accordingly 
(or leaves the community). Yet, social control need not be conservative; reflective 
engagement with others may also lead to escalating spirals of mutual understanding and 
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collaboration (or of misunderstanding and outrage), and thereby sow the seeds for 
change. 
Motivation. Motivation refers to the reasons why people participate in collective 
efforts. The decided social order solution motivates members to contribute to the 
accomplishment of organizational goals by creating explicit and routinely distributed 
(material) incentives (Zald and Ash, 1966). Incentives can be positive through the 
granting of rewards or negative through the imposition of sanctions. Both the nature—
material, symbolic—and amount of incentives are standardized in relation to the 
outcome of monitoring and therefore largely speak to extrinsic motivation. This solution 
to motivation relies on the attribution of goods that are external to the practice (cf. 
Macintyre, 2007: chapter 14). Administering incentives is decided by incumbents of 
offices with appropriate decision-making authority.  
In comparison, the emergent social order solution to motivation relies on 
participants’ intrinsic motivation to contribute. In Macintyre’s (2007) language, 
contributing to the collective effort is a virtue, such that its rewards are internal to the 
practice. Intrinsic motivation can be enhanced when others recognize and approve the 
associated contribution in the context of the group’s norms and values. Esteem may 
follow. Because such rewards are non-competitive, participants are more likely to assist 
each other. Combined with mutualism (de Bakker et al., 2017), relying on intrinsic 
motivation reinforces norms of solidarity and altruism. Nevertheless, solidarity is often 
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a weak incentive and realisation of purpose (e.g. a movement’s social change goal) may 
lead to the demise of collective action (Zald and Ash, 1966). Participants’ efforts may 
vary considerably in amount or nature: some may enjoy similar levels of recognition 
regardless of input, whereas those whose efforts clearly exceed may be viewed with 
both admiration and suspicion simultaneously. 
In summary, social order is constituted in both decided and emergent elements. 
It evolves through decision-making to buttress social order; as a reflexive response to 
the prevailing social order, and autonomously as social networks and institutions 
evolve. This implies that in organized settings people have the possibility to forgo 
decision-making when they wish to change the prevailing order and, instead, rely on 
emergent sources of social order to accomplish coordination and collaboration. In what 
follows, we will examine the constitution of social order in the alternative currency 
movement, and more particularly, timebanking as an initiative in this movement. 
Method 
The case 
In timebanks, reciprocal exchanges of time units happen in a peer-to-peer network 
(Laamanen et al., 2015; North, 2014). The focus is on creating and maintaining an 
inclusive local economy. Seeking a viable alternative to the current socio-economic 
hegemony, timebankers share values based on sharing, collaboration and mutuality, and 
resist hierarchy (Author 3 & 4). Stadin Aikapankki (STAP or Helsinki Timebank) is the 
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largest timebank in Finland; it has operated in metropolitan Helsinki since 2009. 
Participation is inclusive; anybody can join by filling in an online membership 
registration form. Exchanges between members are registered in an electronic ledger; 
their value is expressed in the community currency of tovi—Finnish for ‘a while’; one 
tovi represents one hour of work. By December 2017, STAP’s 3,500 members had 
completed more than 10,000 exchanges to an accumulated value of slightly over 34,000 
tovi.   
The principles guiding community interactions were made explicit in 2013 with 
the adoption of the ‘ABC’ of trading rules. Members commit to the ABC upon joining. 
The community consciously eschews political affiliation and refuses to adopt a 
recognized organizational form. Administrative work and decision-making in STAP 
adhere to the ideals of stigmergy and adhocracy (Author 3), which refer to the self-
selective and self-directing distribution of administrative and other support tasks, and to 
stimulating equality and maximum voice for all members in matters concerning the 
collective and minimizing personified authority, respectively. 
Data collection and analysis 
Our mixed method approach combines various archival data to examine how STAP 
members drew on elements of decided and emergent social order in organizing STAP. 
The archival data include 41 documents from membership meeting memos and 
newsletters used in internal communication between November 2009 and December 
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2017 (about 27,000 words of text in total). Furthermore, we analyzed the exchanges as 
recorded in the electronic ledger, from between January 2010 to December 2017, which 
include member-to-member transactions, internal tax levies, and payments for services 
to organize and promote the timebank. The data allowed us to trace the evolution of 
membership, the intensity of trading, and characteristics of the social network of STAP 
members. STAP membership meeting—the principal decision-making body—gave us 
explicit approval to access and use the internal documents and the community ledger for 
research purposes. 
The first author, a native speaker of Finnish, translated all documentary data 
from Finnish to English. The translated documents were coded in Atlas.ti. To increase 
reliability, two of the authors undertook first and second-order coding and initial 
analysis. We furthermore calculated word frequencies relating to ‘discussion’ and 
‘decision’ to obtain a sense of the relevance of decided social order in the community 
discourse. Data in the community ledger allowed us to calculate the number and value 
of exchanges over time and the number of actively trading members (Figures 1-3). We 
also used these data to construct and analyze social network matrices, using Ucinet 
(Borgatti et al., 2002). We created an affiliation matrix which shows who traded with 
whom and calculated the density of this network (Figure 4).  
[Insert Figures 1-4] 
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The mixed method approach allowed us to triangulate between the researchers’ 
interpretations, and between the various data sources. Our interpretation of the data 
emerged from repeated discussions in regular meetings and evolved over the various 
versions of the manuscript. 
Analysis 
Three phases in the blending of emergent and decided social order 
We explored, in an abductive manner (Dubois and Gadde, 2002), STAP’s dynamics 
over time by tracing the trading network of STAP members. Participation and exchange 
activities were highest during the years 2012-2013 (Figures 1-3). Social network theory 
suggests that networks are more cohesive when there is a larger number of connections 
among members—when network density is higher—resulting in more cohesion in the 
network. Network connectedness and cohesion matter for flows of resources and 
information (Borgatti et al., 2009). A dense network further facilitates the diffusion of 
social norms (Oh et al., 2004) whereas decreasing density signifies reduced 
connectedness and the potential weakening of collective norms. We calculated annual 
network densities by considering trade exchanges as ties in order to map the 
connectedness of STAP members over time and found that network density was lowest 
in 2012 (Figure 4). Network cohesion was lowest at the same time when membership 
and exchange activity peeked.  
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Next, we analyzed STAP’s newsletters, meeting memos and other texts for 
indications of the community’s orientation to decided social order. First, we listed the 
documents chronologically and counted the number of words per document (Table 1). 
The total and average word count per document peaked in the years 2013-2014 (Figure 
5). We also counted the number of times the words “decision” and “discussion” 
(including their derivatives) are mentioned (Figure 6). These words appeared 
considerably more frequent in the years 2013-2014 than in other years, both in absolute 
and relative terms (Figure 7). 
[Insert Table 1] 
[Insert Figures 5-7] 
This quantitative inspection of documents and log file data from the community 
ledger suggests that there are three phases in STAP’s orientation on elements of decided 
social order, and in how the STAP community understood and practiced its organizing 
(see also Author 3). In the first phase (2009-2011), STAP relied on emergent social 
order in organizing; the second phase (2012-2014) showed a more prominent 
orientation on decided social order, and the third phase (2015-2017) came with a 
renewed reliance on emergent social order. The transitions from the first to the second 
and from the second to the third phases took place in early 2012 and by the end of 2014, 
respectively.  
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How may we explain the waxing and waning of reliance on decided social 
order? We focus on two topics—the community’s size and issues relating to taxation—
that were recurrent in the history of STAP and provoked continuing discussion about 
and activity relating to the community’s organizing. First, timebanks seek to increase 
their membership—size—in order to sustain activity and increase their potential of 
making a positive impact (North, 2005). Yet, in STAP, the increase in membership 
challenged its predominant reliance on emergent social order in phase 1. Several 
interventions ensued, including attempts to activate smaller groups within the larger 
structure and drafting the ABC. Phase 2 was thus characterized by increased reliance on 
decided social order as rules and administrative functions (the coordinator) were 
introduced. During phase 3, the elements of decided social order introduced during 
phase 2 lost much of their significance: for instance, rule following proved problematic 
and organizational discussions were not returned to leaving the question of structure 
unresolved. 
Second, taxation has been central to STAP organizing (Joutsenvirta, 2016; 
Author 3). Initially, during phase 1, taxation concerned the redistribution of community 
‘wealth’ through the internal tax paid to the community to enable community 
maintenance tasks; a limited amount of decided social order was in place to support 
organizing through emergent social order. At the end of phase 1, the ‘tovi tax’ was 
recoined as a ‘social policy instrument’ that should enable an orchestrated use of 
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community wealth in order to sustain organizing. During phase 2, in November 2013 
the tax authorities ruled to tax professional work in timebanks: this increased the 
importance of internal taxation as an instrument that creates social goods beyond 
community organization and premised attempts to develop a decided-order an approach 
to tovi tax. Consequently, during phase 3, since 2015, taxation mainly dealt with the 
aftermath of the tax authorities’ decision and the ensuing attempts to counteract 
community decline and legitimize timebanking in collaboration with institutions, such 
as the municipality. 
While both size and taxation challenged the community to take a stance on 
organizing, the issues also illustrate how STAP members, and particularly those in the 
active core group, held diverging views on how to address it, thereby influencing the 
dynamics of organizing and the blending of its elements. In the next two sections, we 
discuss these two issues in detail.  
Size 
Late 2009, a handful of individuals established Kumpulan Vaihtopiiri (KVP) in the 
Kumpula neighborhood of Helsinki. The initiators looked for practical ways to 
strengthen the economy and increase wellbeing in the neighborhood. In May 2010, the 
community renamed itself Stadin Aikapankki (STAP) to acknowledge that a 
considerable number of its members now came from all around Helsinki, well beyond 
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the boundaries of Kumpula. STAP also affiliated with “the international timebanking 
movement” (STAP newsletter, 5 May 2010). 
In the early years, central focus was on growing the community. STAP attracted 
considerable publicity in both local and national media, and STAP encouraged its 
members to take part in recruitment and promotional activities. Until 2012, the 
community newsletters prominently featured information on the growth of its 
membership and exchange activities. After rapid growth in 2010-2012, STAP 
membership shrunk from 2013 onwards (Figures 1-3).  
Yet, how did size affect the blending of organizational elements? In the early 
years, the initiators communicated the operating principles of timebanking in 
newsletters. They also organized information events during which new and prospective 
members could learn about STAP and timebanking. Most of these activities were ‘one-
directional’ communication from the initiators to the membership; members were 
expected to contribute through entering exchanges and by ‘spreading the word’.  
In May 2010, the first gathering of members established the membership 
meeting as the community’s supreme decision-making body and with this, changed the 
community’s one-directional orientation. By vesting authority in the collectivity, the de 
facto leadership—the initiators and active members of the so-called core group—were 
made subservient to the membership meeting. The balance of emergent and decided 
social order in the timebank changed more drastically two years later. By February 
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2012, there were 1,300 registered members. With rapid growth, socialization of new 
members became increasingly challenging. At the same time, new members’ lack of 
familiarity with the community’s ideological rooting in inclusive alternative economy 
building with its implicitly exercised adhocratic and stigmergic organizing posed a 
challenge to the community overall. By 2012, the newsletters no longer mentioned 
numbers of new members or exchanges and instead, greater emphasis was placed on the 
community’s values regarding behavior. This suggests that the focus of the community 
changed from inclusion to socialization. 
Dealing with growth whilst holding true to the community ideals can be 
illustrated through two interventions. The first intervention, in January 2011, was the 
proposal to establish neighborhood chapters. This initiative responded to the 
geographical spread of STAP members but can also be interpreted as a way to 
decentralize organizing and to stimulate members to increase their involvement in 
administrative work. These efforts were unsuccessful and the documents suggest there 
were only two failed attempts to establish local chapters. Consequently, the move from 
a neighborhood exchange group (KVP) to a timebank that covers the metropolitan 
region (STAP) reinforced centrality in terms of authority in organizing. Without local 
stigmergy, the overall tasks of organizing fell onto a few active individuals who in the 
core group became responsible for dealing with everyday activities, mostly responding 
to issues emerging in and around the community. Although this seemed a step toward 
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oligarchization, it is, however, important to note that the core group remained open to 
participation by any member. 
The second intervention came in November 2011, when the membership 
meeting explicated the community’s values and behavioral expectations. This 
intervention was a reaction to the acceptance of communities and (business) 
organizations as STAP members, and to the growing practice of valuing exchanges in 
euros alongside (and sometimes, instead of) tovi. The January 2013 membership 
meeting was, however, and somewhat ironically, of the opinion that the community’s 
values as outlined in late 2011 had not accomplished their purpose; the meeting debated 
but did not decide to create a “category police” to systematically monitor members’ 
behaviors. The meeting decided to stipulate the community’s norms and values as rules 
for “good” exchanges; the May 2013 meeting accepted the collectively workshopped 
ABC.  
These interventions illustrate both an involuntary emergence of authority but 
also a conscious decision on codified principles. With this, an orientation towards 
decided social order was laid. In practice, for example, prospective members need to 
accept the ABC upon registration by confirming “I have reviewed STAP's operating 
principles […] and agree to abide by them while using the timebank,” whereas 
organizations wishing to participate need to explicate in their application how their 
activity will align with STAP’s espoused values. 
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These two interventions foreshadow discussions during 2013-2014. The process 
of workshopping of the ABC had uncovered community tensions and while values and 
rules regulated members’ exchange behaviors, the centralization of power and hidden 
hierarchies was questioned by some STAP members. Although the membership 
meeting is the main decision-making body, everyday organizing and administrative 
work fell onto the core group. In the membership meetings, this situation was heavily 
debated:  
As the number of members grows and the number of active actors has 
increased, the need to better organize the activities connected to running 
STAP has increased. STAP has very active members [performing 
administrative tasks] […] Since STAP is not a registered association […] 
there has been no need for a formal board or similar body […] [as the] 
idea has also been to promote horizontal and direct democracy, where 
responsibility is shared together. It was argued that the principle of 
activities is independence and solidarity. In practice, it is challenging […] 
It was noted that in the future task sharing, information flow and decision-
making need to be communicated better than currently and that more 
organization is needed. (STAP membership meeting memo, 2/2013). 
 
To decentralize authority, special working groups were created alongside the 
core group. For instance, a conciliation group was created to mediate disagreements 
between exchange partners. The three parties would discuss whether the ABC had been 
respected during the disputed exchange—an ex post facto observation rather than a 
systematic monitoring of membership. Likewise, in 2013, a working group prepared a 
response to the inquiry by the Finnish tax authorities about taxable work in the 
community (see next section).  
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From 2015 onwards, the meeting memos have become short and approximate. 
This change in style is important per se—irrespective of the possible reasons for the 
change in style, such as a change in authorship—because the community accepted the 
curtailing of information provided to the membership. STAP focused on finding ways 
to remain relevant: building local neighborhood economy and rekindling the dwindling 
community. The most interesting feature is the re-emergence, in 2017, of the 
discussions about regulating exchanges. Repeating discussions from 2012-2013, the 
meeting memos refer to norms and rules for exchanging, such as the need to use one’s 
own name in the system and the types of charges related to the exchanges. They 
indicate how exchange issues were brought up and how they were dealt with by 
repeating existing policies and further specifying existing rules.  
Taxation 
Since its early days, KVP/STAP has considered the potential ramifications of its 
activities vis-à-vis taxation. The initiators considered their initiative as a way to foster 
“neighborhood help”: 
[KVP] is a timebank, i.e. services are exchanged in relation to time, not to 
euros […] [it does] not have the purpose of creating local money but aims 
to reinforce social relationships […] This choice is essential from the 
point of view of the tax officials. […] the general principle [of exchange 
networks in Finland] is that the exchange is equated with neighborhood 
help, not [with income from] wages or sales. (KVP newsletter, 12/2009) 
 
This statement presents timebanking as in line with the Finnish legislation on 
community work that grants tax exemptions for everyman’s work (i.e. work that 
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requires no particular qualification) and community volunteering. KVP/STAP shunned 
the use of the fiat currency in exchanges and a conversion rate between tovi and euro 
was not determined. These decisions expose the assumption that participation should be 
motivated by solidarity incentives, rather than material gain. 
Valuation and personal gain would nevertheless be the very issues that led the 
tax authorities to review whether community work and individual participation in 
timebanks should be considered everyman’s work or taxable labor. Elsewhere in Europe 
(e.g. in the UK and the Netherlands) it is common practice for timebanks to register as 
legal entities in order to guarantee tax exemption to communal and individual activities. 
STAP had previously not sought to find out how the tax authorities would interpret its 
activities nor had it registered as an association. Yet, STAP’s prominent media exposure 
initiated a public discussion (e.g. in the Finnish parliament) on the impact of new 
economic models on society. Consequently, the tax authorities started an investigation 
of timebanking in 2013. As the largest timebank in the country, STAP was central in the 
investigation. The August 2013 membership meeting created a tax working group to try 
influence the tax authorities’ looming decision by formulating a written response to the 
findings of the initial inquiry. This was to no avail: the tax authorities ruled to tax 
professional work in timebanks in November 2013. This outcome, combined with the 
problematic process of creating a response in the first place, generated frustrations in 
the community. This frustration was another reason, alongside the issue of size (see 
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previous section), why discussions started on how STAP makes decisions and 
organizes, and whether a more traditional mode of organizing would be appropriate. 
The main community-borne intervention in relation to the topic of taxation was 
the collection of a ‘tovi-tax’: an internal levy on the value of exchanges, held on the 
STAP Community Account. It was introduced when STAP was established. Over time, 
the justification for the tovi-tax eviolved. Initially, it was justified and used as a means 
to compensate those members who participate in administrative work and to support 
members with permanent deficits on their accounts. The September 2012 membership 
meeting changed the tovi-tax narrative from it being an internal ‘community tool’ to a 
more encompassing ‘social policy instrument’. Interestingly, and perhaps in anticipation 
of the adverse tax decision, the August 2013 membership meeting discussed how 
internal taxation could be used for the common good in collaboration with the City of 
Helsinki. 
Thus, the tax authorities’ interest in timebanking premised two interventions in 
organizing the timebank. The first intervention, in 2011, was to start exploring 
collaboration with other organizations and a reframing of the purpose of the tovi-tax. A 
discussion document outlined options for the community; it could choose to work with 
the state/municipality or funnel the proceeds to support activities of its member 
organizations. Effectively the latter option became dominant. With the tax authorities’ 
ruling, the urgency to collaborate with external organizations (and particularly those 
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with political influence) increased as collaboration is seen to bring legitimacy to 
timebanking and protect it from decline.  
The second intervention was therefore to find ways of co-operating with the 
municipality. STAP was mentioned in the 2012 city of Helsinki’s Global Responsibility 
Strategy, but the promises of support did not translate into much dedicated action on the 
part of the city. In 2015 and 2016, STAP organized public meetings and discussions 
with city politicians and civil servants to garner their support. Membership was 
informed of these events in November 2014 and April 2015. The membership meeting 
memos, however, do not mention discussions or decisions relating to these events.  
The idea behind seeking collaboration with the city was to mobilize support and 
legitimize timebanking. STAP proposed that the contested economic ‘gains’ in the 
community could be channeled to the greater public good through investing proceeds of 
the tovi-tax to generate social services in the city’s neighborhoods. This solution would 
respect the community’s alternative views on valuing work. In 2017, members of the 
STAP core group made a proposal seeking explicit participation and support for the 
tovi-tax from the City of Helsinki as a reaction to the city’s general call for social 
actors’ proposals on the renewal of its strategy. This was communicated to the 
membership in March 2017. 
Whereas the reframing of the justification for internal taxation can be thought of 
as being more or less in line with STAP’s mission to reinforce local neighborhoods, the 
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reaching out to the City of Helsinki is a departure from the initial conviction that STAP 
should remain autonomous. Yet, as collaborations were sought, this point was never 
brought up as a topic for discussion and, perhaps consequently, there was no push-back 
from the community.  
Based on the above presentation of the issues of size and taxation, we turn to 
highlighting the dynamics of emergent and decided organizing within STAP.  
Organizing 
Connected to the issues of community growth and the threat from the tax authorities, 
tensions among the (core) members intensified about the question how to organize 
STAP throughout the three phases. Especially during phase 2, some members were of 
the opinion that the ideal of stigmergic organizing was privileging action promoted by a 
few core group members whose activities were not transparent to other members. 
Consequently, they demanded clearer procedures for administrative work and more 
transparency regarding how power was wielded. Whereas bureaucratization was 
rejected time and again, lack of transparency was perceived as a sign of oligarchization. 
These tensions culminated in heated discussion during two membership meetings, in 
February and May 2014, that addressed the question of organization. The February 
2014 meeting sketched two potential ways to de-oligarchizise authority: “hierarchy” 
and “adhocracy”. The former option would imply registration as an association, setting 
up a board, annual documentation and other mechanisms to comply with legislative 
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requirements. The latter option would not imply any substantial change in the 
community’s reliance on stigmergy and adhocracy. The discussion did not culminate in 
a clear choice; instead, it was decided that more members should be involved in the 
discussion. Therefore, an extensive summary of the two options was sent to all 
members and uploaded to the community website, and members were sent email 
invitations to express their views on how STAP should proceed. There was only one 
comment on the website: 
As an outsider new timebanker, I feel that the most important thing is to 
get the information going. What the form of organization is does not seem 
so essential to a new member. At this time, it is difficult to find out who are 
really behind the timebank, how the timebank bookkeeping is done, etc. 
Such things seem to me more important than the organization's structure. 
The structure of the organization should be chosen according to the form 
of activity, so that the structure supports the activity. 
(https://stadinaikapankki.wordpress.com/tietoja/miten-stadin-aikapankki-
toimii/keskustelua-stapin-rakenteesta/) 
 
While membership meetings are open to everybody, in practice only a few 
members attended, and even fewer attended regularly. Figure 8 shows the attendance of 
the three meetings–March and August 2013, and February 2014–that ignited and 
addressed the form and function of organizing in STAP (the first two were meetings to 
respond to the tax decision and the final was a meeting discussed above addressing 
organizational form). The network map in Figure 8 shows that only a small group of 
people attended the meetings.  
[Insert Figure 8] 
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Moreover, and related to the pressing question of authority, core group members 
received relatively more tovi-tax than other members did. Through their participation in 
the core group and member meetings, they were entitled to receiving community 
account tovi as compensation for their time and effort. In Figure 8, core group members 
receiving tovi-tax are identified by black dots. The connection between these data 
illustrate the tendency to oligarchization: as the membership meetings renounced the 
option of increasing decided social order, the few persons who regularly attended 
meetings and were most active in the community found themselves vulnerable to the 
accusation of establishing an oligarchy, simply because of being present and active.  
Given the lack of membership engagement with the topic of transparency and 
the need to address the tensions, the May 2014 membership meeting discussed, again 
extensively, the option of either developing a more structured organization or 
maintaining an organically evolving initiative. The lack of agreement led to the 
compromise decision—or rather, a truce—to appoint a coordinator whose role it was to 
deal with day-to-day administrative tasks, but not to make decisions: 
It was generally considered important not to limit the tasks too much, but 
that the job description develops more with experience and over time. In 
addition, an emphasis on close cooperation with the core group and the 
membership, especially in larger decisions, was highlighted. (STAP 
membership meeting memo, 5/2014) 
 
Consequently, the organizational question was left unresolved, but new functions and 
roles were introduced. Yet, what seemed like an oligarchy by 2014, dissolved later and 
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suggests a kind of de-oligarchization whereby the distribution of administrative work 
returned to its stigmergic roots. Indeed, without regular communication to and meetings 
with membership, various initiatives were taken forward without much decision or 
discussion.  
Discussion 
STAP was initiated on the premise of an ideology that emphasized inclusive 
participation and decision-making and sought to rely on elements of emergent social 
order in its organizing. Early on, it experienced a rapid increase in membership and 
exchanges. Nevertheless, network density decreased steadily until 2012 (Figure 4), 
paralleling a shift in organizing in which elements of decided social order became more 
prominent. The increasing number of members put a strain on the efficacy of relying on 
emergent social order, as it became increasingly difficult to practice stigmergic work 
and adhocratic decision-making. However, the social network data suggest that the 
difficulty of upholding emergent social order is associated with a growing discrepancy 
in the increase of membership and exchange activity. Also the introduction of 
membership by organizations further introduced difficulties, as organizational members 
were not very active and unfamiliar with the timebank and its practices and norms (for a 
discussion of the consequences of organizational membership, see Ahrne and Brunsson, 
2008). Consequently, the community made its norms and values explicit and 
transformed them into rules. We suggest that this trend is a response to the difficulty of 
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relying on elements of emergent social order, because a lack of interaction between 
members curtailed the socialization and maintenance of norms. Vice versa, one may 
expect that resorting to elements of decided social order when network density is 
increasing is less needed in the timebank. Yet, the introduction of elements of decided 
social order was reluctantly accepted. Many members resented and opposed the 
introduction of elements of decided social order. Time and again, issues were 
thoroughly discussed in the membership meeting but not decided. We can thus see that 
the organization of STAP is an eclectic mix of elements, blending between decided and 
emergent order (Figure 9). 
[Insert Figure 9] 
Organizing in STAP demanded a continuous investment of energy, especially by 
the core group members. It was during phase 2 that internal tensions about how to 
organize were most apparent. This is clearly visible in the documentation relating to 
organizing efforts in 2014. The need for clarity in terms of organization was called for: 
“How are common tasks allocated and how are activities coordinated? Is a hierarchical 
operating culture needed? Or is a flexible ‘adhocracy’ with no established structures 
supported?” (STAP membership notification, 3/2014). With conflict on STAP’s 
organizing practices mounting, the transition from the second to the third phase is most 
notably visible in administration. In STAP, the tension around oligarchization translated 
to how, even after several attempts to involve more people, central positions remained 
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occupied by long-standing members of the community, including some of the initiators 
of the timebank. 
Compromise decisions, such as the coordinator role, moved visible authority to 
a state of invisibility and disappeared from all communication. In this way, the 
community organically returned to its stigmergic practices. Meetings were organized, 
projects moved forward, and statements were made. Yet, there is no documentation of 
decision-making; we are unable to assert  whether no decisions were made or whether 
decisions were made in closed groups (similar to the situation before 2010). Overall, the 
tax authorities’ stance on timebanking was a large blow to the community; it was a 
major reason for the decline in membership and the number of exchanges. Timebanking 
also disappeared from public discourse. When the number of exchanges decreased, 
STAP turned away from decided social order, which is most apparent in its rejection of 
an explicit organizational structure.  
Based on our case study, we seek to contribute to the literature in the following 
three ways. We speak to the literature of social movement organizing by exploring how 
a social movement initiative engaged with social order over time, thus advancing our 
understanding of the dynamics of organizing social movement initiatives (see also 
Author 3). First, we extend the ongoing debate on the inescapability of 
bureaucratization or oligarchization of social movement organisations (Walker and 
Martin, 2019) by considering organizing as a liminal process (much akin the pioneering 
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work of Zald and Ash, 1966). In this process, active participants of social movement 
initiatives draw on various, at times contradictory, opportunities to organize and by this 
render their ‘organization’ more or less bureaucratic, more or less dependent on specific 
individuals, to ensure continuation of their ideas of social change (see Kinna, 2016). 
Our case study illustrates a turn away from decided social order. At the same time, the 
perceived trend to oligarchization was followed by attempts at de-oligarchization, 
whereas bureaucratization, too, was rejected time and again. Thus, neither 
oligarchization nor bureaucratization were ever comprehensive as the community 
remained characterized by indecision and a loss of practical relevance of previous 
decisions. This indecision, in which “closure appears elusive” (Denis et al., 2011: 225), 
enabled the community to procrastinate decision-making, postponing some decisions 
until they were no longer needed.  
Our analysis of how the STAP community sought to keep its organizing aligned 
with its ideals through collective reflection on the prevailing social order, provides 
important insights and direction for future research. For example, future studies could 
investigate in more detail the reflective ability of participants in other settings. Our 
account provides details on how the dynamics of partial organizations unfold, 
identifying the importance of non-decision in between emergent and decided social 
order.  
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Second, and relatedly, we theoretically argue and empirically show that a dual 
perspective of both emergent and decided social order affords a fine-grained picture of a 
community immersed in organizing. Contributing to the literature on partial 
organisation, we propose elements of emergent social order as functional equivalents to 
previously described elements of decided social order (cf. Ahrne, 2015). The dual 
perspective of emergent and decided social order further helps to elaborate the nature of 
organizing as a fragile and ever-changing process that cannot be reduced to purposeful, 
teleological interventions of decision-making. With this, we add to an ongoing debate 
between organizational scholars (Ahrne et al., 2016, 2017; Apelt et al., 2017). The 
concepts of decision and decision-making as typically used in the partial organization 
literature have not yet been much developed beyond the understanding of them as 
deliberate and purposeful interventions. Yet, others have shown that decisions may just 
happen (Cohen et al., 1972; March, 2011) or need not be followed by corresponding 
action (Brunsson and Brunsson, 2017), and that people can be trapped in cycles of 
indecision (Denis et al., 2011). People may decide not to decide for various reasons 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1963); Vakkayil (2018), for example, documented how “decided 
non-decision”, the conscious abstaining from decision-making, was used by a social 
movement initiative to maintain its openness to participation by whoever wishes to 
participate. Our study shows how decisions, non-decisions and indecisions may all 
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emerge from the dynamics of decided and emergent social order. Future research may 
further problematize decisions and the process of negotiating them in social orders.  
The discussion around the supposed disappearance of ‘organization’ from 
organizational sociology (Ahrne et al., 2016, 2017; Apelt et al., 2017) reflects a broader 
puzzle of how social order in organized settings evolves over time in the interplay of 
networks, institutions, and decisions. Our study documents a case in which the blending 
of elements of organizing enabled the participants in the social movement initiative to 
engage continuously with their ideas of social change. Finally, our approach is one way 
through which organizationality as “the study of social phenomena as organization, 
rather than … the study of organizations as social phenomena” (Schoeneborn et al., 
2018: 31) can be made operational and thereby illustrative of the ongoing relevance of 
organization in the sociological literature. How STAP members blended elements of 
emergent and decided social order testifies to the relevance of viewing organizing as a 
process. Focusing on decided and emergent elements of social order, we appreciate 
organization as an effort that is never fully accomplished. We agree with those who 
regret that organization is disappearing from organization theory (du Gay, 2000; du Gay 
and Vikkelsø, 2016) and that organizing is a significant and distinctive field of research 
(e.g. Ahrne et al., 2016). Yet, we suggest that elements of decided and emergent social 
order should be given equal treatment in understanding dynamics in organized settings, 
a route that is opened up through the notion of partial organization. Instead of focusing 
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on the disappearance of organization, we suggest that future research may further probe 
into the interplay between emergent and decided social order to navigate the precarious 
waters of partial organization.  
Concluding thoughts 
In this paper, we analysed the dynamics of organizing in STAP over a period of 9 years. 
The point of departure of this study was our understanding of organization as temporary 
and liminal. Organization evolves over time as participants experiment with the kind of 
blend of emergent and decided sources of social order that matches their ideals and it 
allows participants to collaborate and accomplish some common purpose while relying 
on certain ideological practices. As such, our study is illustrative of the ongoing 
relevance of organizing in the sociological literature. To us, organization has not 
disappeared from either social movement studies or organizational sociology; its study 
has transformed, however, to a study of the ways in which it is practiced in the everyday 
of organizing. 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1: Overview of meeting memos 
Year Number of documents 
Sort of 
documents 
Number of 
words 
Average number of 
words per document 
2009 2 Newsletter 821 410 
2010 8 Newsletter 3,909 489 
2011 4 Newsletter 2,833 708 
2012 2 Newsletter 1,358 679 
2013 5 Memo, notification 7,923 1,584 
2014 10 Memo, notification 5,573 557 
2015 3 Memo 1,131 377 
2016 5 Memo, notification 2,333 466 
2017 2 Memo 1,110 555 
Total 41  26,991 647 
 
 
FIGURES 
FIGURE 1: Number of exchanges 
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FIGURE 2: Value of exchanges, in tovi 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Number of active members 
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FIGURE 4: Density of trading network 
 
 
FIGURE 5: Total and average numbers of words in meeting memos 
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FIGURE 6: Total and average number of words (“decision”, “discussion” and 
derivatives)  
 
 
FIGURE 7: Relative prevalence of decision and discussion words in meeting memos  
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FIGURE 8: Attendance of membership meetings (two-mode network: squares represent 
meetings, black dots represent members of the core group, white circles represent other 
attendants) 
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FIGURE 9: Blending of social order in organizing STAP 
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